|Statement||by Paul W. Dobson and Michael Waterson.|
|Series||Research paper / Great Britain. Office of Fair Trading) -- 12, Research paper (Great Britain. Office of Fair Trading) -- 12.|
|Contributions||Waterson, Michael., Great Britain. Office of Fair Trading.|
After discussing the pro-competitive rationale, the potential negative effects of vertical restraints, and the introduction of an economic approach by the Commission, the book examines the block exemption regulation and critically reviews the limits of the revision of EU rules on vertical : Claeys & Casteels Publishing. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS AND COMPETITION POLICY. PREFACE. This is the 12th of a series of research papers (listed overleaf) to be published by the Office of. Book on the matter). This chapter examines the economic foundations of competition policy toward vertical restraints, with a focus on resale price maintenance (RPM). It outlines the theories of RPM as potentially anticompetitive on the basis that such practices support collusion or exclusion at either the upstream supplier stage of a supply chain or, more rarely, the downstream retail stage. In A ntitrust Policy and Vertical Restraints a group of leading scholars takes a hard look at how restraints limit the conditions under which firms may purchase, sell, or resell a good or service.
This new volume analyses in considerable detail the antitrust issues arising from vertical restraints and presents a comprehensive map and critical assessment of current enforcement practice in the European Union. The purpose of the book is to provide extensive guidance to practitioners, businesses and researchers. This report on Competition Policy and Vertical Restraints: Franchising Agreements explores the application of competition policy to vertical relationships in the context of franchised distribution systems. It opens with an economic analysis of franchising and the vertical restraints in such agreements. It goes on to. vertical restraints have been of particular importance to the Union's competition policy. Whilst this policy has been successful in over 30 years of application a review is now necessary because - the single market legislation for the free movement of products is now largely in place - the Regulations governing vertical restraints expire, and. The definitions are excerpt from DG COMP’s Glossary of terms used in EU competition policy (© European Union, ) and the OECD’s Glossary of industrial organisation economics and competition law (© OECD, ). and the accompanying Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (the “Final Report”). The Final Report was published following a.
Vertical restraints are generally less harmful than horizontal restraints and may provide substantial scope for efficiencies. (7) The objective of Article is to ensure that undertakings do not use agreements – in this context, vertical agreements – to restrict competition on the market to the detriment of consumers. Over the last two decades, European competition policy has drastically changed its treatment of vertical restraints imposed by a supplier of products or services on its downstream distributor. This is strikingly evident in the various iterations of the block exemption regulations on vertical practices, which provide a safe harbour for many. In contrast, most arrangements that are adopted for other purposes will not be condemned merely because of some incidental or inconsequential restraint on competition. A similar attitude should guide public policy toward vertical arrangements. The policy concerning vertical restraints is both overly harsh and inconsistent. This book focuses on the current legal framework for vertical agreements in the EU and the US. Over the last ten years, antitrust rules governing these agreements have undergone thorough reform. In the EU, the old sector-specific block exemptions were replaced by Regulation /99, applicable to all sectors of the economy.